[PAA-Discuss] Secret hand that rocks Iran's cradle

[robert]

Secret hand that rocks Iran's cradle
Mehdi Kalaji - NST Online Saturday March 1, 2008

WITH the release of America's National Intelligence Estimate, according to
which Iran has suspended its nuclear weapons programme, the prospect of
military confrontation with the Bush administration dimmed. But months
later, it is clear that the danger is not past, because Iran has not
renounced the production of nuclear weapons, which its enriched uranium
could eventually be used to fuel.

All parties need to find a formula to resolve the issue before it again
threatens to erupt into conflict. Western diplomacy in recent years has
focused on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad as the key to resolving the
crisis. But this approach is a blind alley.

Let us recall the fate of Ahmedinejad's two immediate predecessors. Muhammad
Khatami (1997-2005) tried to implement dramatic political reform, while
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-97) tried to open the Iranian economy to the
West. Both failed, because Iran's presidents do not run the country. A
solution to the nuclear dilemma - or any other problem in Iran's foreign
relations - is in the hands of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Among his responsibilities, Khamenei serves as commander-in-chief of the
military, controls the intelligence services and appoints directors of the
national media. His appointees effectively control most ministries and
Iran's major cities.

In diplomacy, Khamenei tends to operate in a clever but recognisable
fashion. He sends different diplomats into negotiations with contradictory
instructions. Each claims to be acting with the supreme leader's full
authority, but ultimately are unable to make commitments because they have
little idea of what Khamenei wants to do. After a time, they are removed and
a new set of representatives is despatched.

In order to dominate decision-making, Khamenei prefers weak presidents.
Ahmedinejad is no different. His political base has faded, owing to Iran's
deepening economic crisis, which has been intensified by the conflict with
the West over the nuclear issue. His support in the parliamentary election
next March seems particularly weak, which will no doubt please Western
observers. But the election results will not matter: parliament, too, has
little influence over Iran's foreign policy.

Some Western diplomats recognise the supreme leader's role. In practice,
however, Western diplomacy tends to ignore Khamenei, who sabotages any
effort to get around him as the final arbiter of Iranian policy. This might
partly explain why Khamenei has been mistrustful of negotiations with the
West. Westerners don't seem to understand who is in charge. Indeed, some
analysts argue that former President Bill Clinton's efforts to achieve a
breakthrough with Iran failed because they were addressed to Iran's
presidents.

The West should learn from the example of Russian President Vladimir Putin,
who did not travel to Iran until he was allowed a direct meeting with
Khamenei, during which Putin is reported to have made a proposal to end the
nuclear stand-off. There has been no answer yet, though there does seem to
be some recent movement between Russia and Iran on the provision of nuclear
fuel for Iran's controversial reactors.

To be sure, Khamenei is reluctant to meet non-Muslim foreign leaders. But
that shouldn't stop the West from reaching out to him directly or pressing
him to publicly appoint the representatives who negotiate with the West.

One American politician who understands how to work with the Iranian power
structure is former Congressman Lee Hamilton, now head of the Woodrow Wilson
Centre. When Wilson Centre researcher Haleh Esfandiari was arrested in Iran,
Hamilton wrote to Khamenei, pleading for her release on humanitarian
grounds. Khamenei responded - reportedly the first time he answered an
American - and Esfandiari was released in a matter of days.

Khamenei would be hard-pressed to ignore a direct invitation from the US to
negotiate on Iran's most vital concerns. His clear priority is the Islamic
republic's survival, not the fate of particular Iranian politicians. While
Ahmedinejad's apocalyptic vision makes it difficult for Westerners to deal
with him, Khamenei does not want to stumble into a military confrontation
with the West, which would destabilise Iran and possibly lead to the
regime's downfall.

To resolve outstanding issues with Iran, the West should be dealing with the
only person powerful enough to make deals and deliver concessions. That
person is Khamenei, not Ahmedinejad.

Mehdi Khalaji, who studied for 14 years in seminaries in Qom, Iran, is a
visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East policy.
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Last updated 01/03/2008